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No Match for the Police: An Analysis of
Miranda 's Problematic Application to
Juvenile Defendants
by ZOE OVERBECK*
Introduction
The lives of juveniles are defined in many ways by legal
prohibitions and directions from adults. Whether it is the ability to
obtain a driver's license or the chance to participate in the democratic
process by voting, the law treats juveniles and adults differently.
Juveniles operate in a relatively restricted sphere, defined by legal
prohibitions and cues from adults who direct them how to behave,
where to be, and where not to go. Attending school, for instance,
while understandably a worthwhile and noble pursuit, is mandatory,
and absences are punishable with adult-imposed disciplinary
measures, such as detention. While juveniles may emulate adult
behavior, the level of personal freedom afforded to each group is
vastly different. Yet, when the police investigate a juvenile in
connection with a crime, that youth in many ways becomes an adult in
the eyes of the law.
The legal protections that shelter and restrict juveniles in their
daily lives fade away during a criminal investigation, and, suddenly,
the law grants them an immense power-the ability to waive their
constitutional right against self-incrimination-in the same way an
adult can. Where the socialized restriction of juveniles is ingrained in
almost every aspect of a youth's life, such as the expectation to attend
school as told, suddenly, courts perceive youth as being able to move
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2000, History and French, University of Wisconsin, Madison. I am grateful to Professor
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freely and expect them to be able to exercise that option during police
interrogation.
The landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona dramatically changed
the landscape of police interrogation, and recitation of the four
warnings beginning with, "You have the right to remain silent," is
popular dialogue for suspenseful moments in TV dramas and legal
thrillers. While most adults and older juveniles have heard the
Miranda rights repeated in some form or another, not as many
understand that those warnings are not merely a bureaucratic hoop
for the police to jump through, but instead serve to safeguard a
suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Under Miranda, the police may not commence interrogating a suspect
in custody until they advise her of her right to remain silent; that
anything she says may be used against her in a court of law; of her
right to counsel; and that if she can't afford an attorney, one will be
appointed to her before any questioning begins if she wishes.
In Fare v. Michael C. and Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Supreme
Court affirmed the use of adult standards in determining whether a
juvenile is under custodial interrogation and whether the juvenile has
"knowingly and intelligently" waived her Miranda rights. Due to
differences in juvenile cognition, young people's limited
comprehension of the words and substance of the Miranda rights, and
their vulnerability to police interrogation techniques, states should go
beyond the baseline established by the Supreme Court, as some have
already, to offer juvenile suspects the following protections: Age
should always be taken into account when applying the Miranda
custody test; and there should be a per se rule that law enforcement
may not administer Miranda warnings to juvenile suspects in the
absence of defense counsel.
I. The Supreme Court's Evolving Views on
Juvenile Confessions
Under the common law, while there was no separate juvenile
court, there was recognition that certain groups of juvenile offenders
might be less culpable than their adult counterparts.2 Children under
the age of seven were viewed as not being responsible for their
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
2. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 503, 509-10 (1984).
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actions and thus were not subject to criminal adjudication under the
"infancy defense;" juvenile offenders over the age of fourteen were
tried as adults.' To prosecute youth between the ages of seven and
fourteen, the state had to overcome a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity by showing that the child knew his or her actions were
wrong.' In the early 1800s, the Society for the Prevention of
Pauperism in the City of New York began to campaign against the
imprisonment of juvenile offenders with adult convicts and obtained a
charter from the New York legislature to open the House of Refuge,
a home for neglected and delinquent youth.' This sparked the first
wave of juvenile justice reform in the United States, which worked to
remove still "innocent" offenders and pre-delinquents from
corruptive influences and place them in reformatory and industrial
"schools."'
Illinois was the first state to create a special court for juveniles
with the legislature's passage of the Juvenile Court Act in 1899.'
Following the Illinois model, forty-six states, three territories, and the
District of Columbia had adopted separate juvenile courts by 1925.
Under the early juvenile courts, the state was to serve as a benevolent
parental figure for youthful offenders and help shape them into law-
abiding adults.9 The early juvenile courts were marked by informal
proceedings intended to rehabilitate rather than punish children and
a rejection of the adult criminal adjudicative model.10 The notion that
children comprised a vulnerable population deserving of extra
protection was a notable shift from the era when only an infancy
defense was available; yet, in practice, juvenile defendants were still
being adjudicated and interrogated unfairly.
The Supreme Court first began to examine juvenile vulnerability
and susceptibility in the context of police interrogations in Haley v.
3. Id. at 510-11.
4. Id. at 511.
5. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1189-90 (1970).
6. Id. at 1190-91.
7. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Juvenile Court at 100: Birthday Cake or Funeral
Pyre?, 13 CRIM. JUST. 47, 47 (1999).
8. Id. at 48.
9. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
10. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 28,
30 (1998).
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Ohio." The police interrogated the fifteen-year-old defendant in
Haley from midnight to 5 a.m. in the absence of either his parents or
defense counsel, until he confessed to acting as a lookout while two
other juveniles robbed and murdered a store owner. 2 The Haley
Court reversed the juvenile's conviction for murder and held that his
confession was involuntary, explaining that a boy of fifteen "cannot
be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity," and is no
"match for the police in such a contest."" While Haley was decided
before Miranda and the Haley Court was examining whether the
defendant's statement had been coerced in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the Court stated in dicta
that the fact that the police advised the defendant of his constitutional
rights did not give credence to his confession; instead, the Haley
Court noted that finding the boy's confession to be voluntary simply
because he was advised of his rights would "assume ... that a boy of
fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that
advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom of
choice."14
The Supreme Court echoed similar concerns regarding juvenile
confessions through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Gallegos v. Colorado." The fourteen-year-old defendant in Gallegos
was arrested on suspicion of robbing and assaulting an elderly man,
who eventually died from his injuries." The boy confessed after five
days in a juvenile hall, where he never had access to an attorney, his
parents, or any "other friendly adult." 7 The prosecution introduced
the juvenile's signed confession at trial, and the jury convicted him of
first-degree murder." Citing to the Haley decision, the Gallegos
Court considered the boy's youth to be a crucial factor in evaluating
the voluntariness of his confession." The prosecution stated that the
boy had been advised of his right to counsel but that he had not asked
11. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
12. Id. at 597-98.
13. Id. at 599-600.
14. Id. at 599, 601.
15. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962).
16. Id. at 49-50.
17. Id. at 50.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 52-53.
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to see his attorney or his parents.20 Similar to the discussion in Haley,
the Gallegos Court expressed concerns about the young defendant's
ability to understand his rights, stating:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to
have any conception of what will confront him when he is made
accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a
person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and
understanding of the consequences of the questions and
answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to
protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights .... Without some adult protection against
this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.21
The Gallegos Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that the police elicited the boy's confession in violation of his due
process rights, taking into account the totality of the circumstances
and focusing on the procedural unfairness and compulsive nature of
*22the interrogation.
Echoing similar concerns about the vulnerability of juvenile
defendants expressed in the Haley and Gallegos decisions, the Court
dramatically shifted the landscape of juvenile adjudication with its
decision in In re Gault.' The fifteen-year-old defendant in Gault had
been arrested and sentenced to a "State Industrial School" for up to
six years for making "lewd" phone calls to a neighbor, an offense for
which an adult would have been punished with a fine of up to $50 or
jail time of no more than two months.24 The events leading up to the
boy's sentencing were flagrant in their lack of formality and structure:
The police never notified his parents of his initial arrest; he was
detained prior to his sentencing without his parents having any formal
notice of the charges against him; the juvenile delinquency judge
denied the defendant's mother's request to see the neighbor who
allegedly complained of the calls; the boy's conviction was based on a
confession given without any warning that he had the right not to do
so; and his delinquency hearing proceeded without the boy or his
20 Id. at 54.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 54-55.
23. See id. at 49-50; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948).
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1-8, 29 (1967).
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parents being advised of his right to counsel.25 The Gault Court
explained that the boy's juvenile status was no excuse for subjecting
him to a "kangaroo court" devoid of both procedural regularity and
respect for his constitutional rights.26
The Gault Court discussed the goals of the early social reformers
who emphasized rehabilitative and clinical solutions for juvenile
offenders over crime and punishment.27 As juveniles were to be
treated differently than adult defendants, "the rules of criminal
procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable" to juvenile
adjudication.' Among the litany of procedural irregularities suffered
by the Gault defendant, the Court examined the validity of admitting
the young defendant's confession, which the police elicited without
advising the boy or his parents of his right to remain silent.29 Building
off of the foundation set in Haley and Gallegos, the Gault Court
addressed juvenile defendants' unique susceptibility to coercive
police interrogation techniques.' The Gault Court commented on the
absurdity of adult defendants having the protection of the Fifth
Amendment while their more vulnerable juvenile counterparts did
not.3' The Gault Court uprooted the prior informality of juvenile
adjudication, holding that the right to notice of the charges, the right
to confrontation and cross-examination, the right to counsel, and the
privilege against self-incrimination applied in juvenile proceedings.32
Gault brought in a new era of due process for juveniles, yet the
Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania made it clear that juveniles'
constitutional rights extended only so far. The McKeiver Court held
that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under
the Fourteenth Amendment.33 The Court recognized that the juvenile
system was not living up to the idealistic goals behind its creation but
explained that "the imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court
system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding
function," and "would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely
25. Id. at 4, 5, 43-44.
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id. at 15-16.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 43-44.
30. Id. at 44-48.
31. Id. at 47, 55.
32. Id. at 42, 55.
33. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
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in the routine of the criminal process."" The McKeiver Court stated
that the Court, in its prior juvenile due process cases, had "not yet
said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of
crime also are to be enforced or made available" in juvenile
delinquency proceedings and that it "specifically has refrained from
going that far."3
In its key juvenile due process decisions leading up to McKeiver,
the Court acknowledged that juveniles are more vulnerable than
adult criminal defendants. Gault accounted for this vulnerability by
affording juveniles certain constitutional rights extended to adult
criminal defendants. In contrast, the McKeiver Court reasoned that
giving juveniles the right to a jury trial would implicitly close the gap
between the adult and the juvenile adjudicative systems.36 In its
approach to Miranda warnings in a juvenile context following Gault,
the Court has seemingly dispensed with the idea that juveniles are
different from adults, stripping them of any special protections once
the police begin to ask questions.
II. The Supreme Court's Views on Juvenile Confessions
After Gault
Despite the concerns expressed by the Court in Haley, Gallegos,
and Gault regarding juveniles' particular susceptibility to police
pressure, the Court decided against providing juveniles with extra
protection during police interrogation with its decisions in
Yarborough v. Alvarado and Fare v. Michael C." The police must
advise a suspect of her Miranda rights when that person is subjected
to custodial interrogation." Interrogation occurs with "express
questioning [by law enforcement] or its functional equivalent
[meaning] ... any words or actions ... that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." 39 Routine booking questions, such as a police officer asking
for a suspect's age or name, are not considered interrogation for
34. Id. at 547.
35. Id. at 531, 533.
36. Id. at 547.
37. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004); Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
39. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
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Miranda purposes.' Although the interrogation inquiry focuses on
the perception of the suspect over the intent of the police, any
information the officer has regarding the suspect's susceptibility to a
particular form of persuasion is relevant to the analysis.41 Thus, the
interrogation test is objective on its surface, yet it also takes into
account any particular vulnerabilities of the suspect, if known to the
officer.42
In contrast, the custody analysis is purely objective. An
individual is in custody when under formal arrest or when the police
deprive her of her liberty to leave in a significant way, depending on
"how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being
questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of
action." 43 The Supreme Court held in Yarborough v. Alvarado that it
was reasonable for a California Court of Appeal to apply the Miranda
custody test to a juvenile defendant, Michael Alvarado, without
taking his age and lack of prior experience with law enforcement into
account."
At the age of seventeen, Alvarado agreed to help a friend steal a
truck while the driver was standing by the vehicle. 45 Alvarado's friend
shot and killed the driver during the attempted robbery, and
Alvarado helped him hide the gun. 46  After a month-long
investigation of the murder, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Detective
Cheryl Comstock left messages with Alvarado's parents about
wanting to speak with him. Alvarado's parents brought him to the
station and waited in the lobby, while the detective took the boy into
an interrogation room and questioned him for roughly two hours
without giving him the Miranda warnings and while recording
Alvarado without his knowledge.' Alvarado claimed to the trial
court that the police denied his request to have his parents present
during the interview.49 After Comstock implored Alvarado to help
40. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990).
41. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 302 n.8.
42. Id.
43. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994).
44. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659, 668-69 (2004).
45. Id. at 655-56.
46. Id. at 656.
47. Id.
4& Id.
49. Id.
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bring his friend to justice for murdering the truck driver, Alvarado
admitted to hiding the gun.'
Alvarado filed a motion to suppress the statements he made
during his interview with Comstock, which the trial court denied."
He was convicted of second-degree murder with a sentence of fifteen
years to life.52 After losing on direct appeal, Alvarado filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, which agreed that Alvarado had not
been in custody when he confessed as "a reasonable person would
have felt at liberty to leave" in that situation." The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found differently and reversed, holding that a
juvenile's age and experience must be considered when evaluating
whether a defendant is in custody under Miranda, and that based on
Alvarado's age and lack of criminal record, he had been under
custodial interrogation when he made the incriminating statements.5
The Ninth Circuit held that Alvarado was entitled to relief even
under the deferential standard of habeas review that federal courts
are required to use when evaluating state court decisions under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA")." Under the AEDPA, federal courts are only to grant
applications for writs of habeas corpus if the state court's decision was
"contrary to" or involved an "unreasonable application of, clearly
established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States."" The Ninth Circuit held that "it was unreasonable
[for the California Court of Appeal] to conclude that a reasonable 17-
year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews, would
have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave."' The Alvarado Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision,
holding that the California Court of Appeal's decision had been
reasonable."
50. Id. at 657-58.
51. Id. at 658.
52. Id. at 659.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 660.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 655.
57. Id. at 660 (citing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2002)).
58. Id. at 664.
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Writing the Alvarado majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
explained that the "custody inquiry states an objective rule designed
to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's
individual characteristics-including his age could be viewed as
creating a subjective inquiry."" The Alvarado Court stated that
taking a suspect's previous experience with law enforcement into
account in the custody analysis could easily cross the line into
speculation, given that a criminal record could either give the
defendant a greater understanding of her rights or alternately create
more fear of re-arrest and the police." The Alvarado Court
emphasized that the police should not bear the task of evaluating a
suspect's subjective state when deciding whether or not to administer
the Miranda warnings."
The Alvarado Court distinguished the objective Miranda custody
test from other doctrinal tests that take a suspect's age and experience
into account, such as when evaluating the voluntariness of a Miranda
waiver or a confession.62 However, in her concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor stated that "[t]here may be cases in which a suspect's age
will be relevant" in the Miranda custody analysis, but that in
Alvarado's case, it would have been difficult for the police to
"recognize that a suspect is a juvenile when he is so close to the age of
majority."" The Court also refrained from adopting a special
protective standard for juveniles when looking at the waiver of
Miranda rights.
For the police to use statements obtained during a custodial
interrogation, they must first advise the suspect of her Miranda
rights.' If the interrogation continues after administration of the
Miranda warnings in the absence of the suspect's attorney, the
government has the burden of showing that "the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel" to use
statements made during the interrogation. 5 If the suspect clearly and
unambiguously requests counsel at any point during the
59. Id. at 668.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 668-69.
62. Id. at 667-68.
63. Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,477 (1966).
65. Id. at 475.
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interrogation, the police must cease all questions.' In Fare v. Michael
C., the Supreme Court upheld the use of a totality of the
circumstances test for determining when juveniles have "knowingly
and intelligently" waived their rights-the same standard that the
Court applies with adult suspects.
The police arrested the juvenile defendant in Fare, a sixteen-and-
a-half-year-old boy who had a history of prior offenses and had been
on probation since the age of twelve, on suspicion of murder and
advised him of his Miranda rights prior to interrogation.' When the
police asked the young defendant if he "want[ed] to give up [his] right
to have an attorney present" in the interrogation room, in which only
the juvenile and two officers were present, the youth asked if he could
have his probation officer in the room.69 The officer replied that he
could call the probation officer later but that he would not do it at
that point, thereafter explaining to the juvenile twice that he could
speak without an attorney present but that he did not have to.70 The
Fare defendant confirmed that he understood his rights and
proceeded to implicate himself in the murder."
After holding that a juvenile's request to speak to his probation
officer was not a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the Fare Court went on to explain that a
"totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to determine
whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of
juveniles is involved," taking into account the youth's "age,
experience, education, background, and intelligence, and ... whether
[the juvenile] has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him."7 2 The Fare Court explained that "[t]here is no reason to assume
that ... juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this area .. . will
be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to
take into account those special concerns."73
In a strong dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, addressed juveniles' susceptibility to police coercion and
66. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).
67. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979).
68. Id. at 709-10.
69. Id. at 710.
70. Id. at 711.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 725.
73. Id.
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argued that "Miranda requires that interrogation cease whenever a
juvenile requests an adult who is obligated to represent his
interests."74 The Fare dissent argued that a juvenile would be less
trusting of the police to obtain an attorney for him than he would be
of his parents or another adult accountable for his welfare." As an
example, Justice Marshall cited to a moment of confusion when the
police were interrogating the Fare defendant, which the majority
overlooked, when the youth asked, "How I know you guys won't pull
no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?" 76
IH. Juvenile Cognition and the Application of Miranda
In its decision to use adult standards when undertaking the
Miranda custody test or evaluating whether a juvenile suspect has
"knowingly and intelligently" waived her Miranda rights, the Court
has not taken into account the following key differences
distinguishing juveniles from adults and how these discrepancies are
particularly worrisome in the context of police interrogation:
variations between juvenile and adult cognition; juveniles' relatively
limited understanding of the meaning and substance behind the
Miranda warnings; and juveniles' unique vulnerability to police
interrogation techniques.
A. Differences between Juvenile and Adult Cognition
The "teenage brain" has become an increasingly prevalent topic
of discussion in the popular media, with technological advances in
neuroscience enabling more illuminating studies of brain processes.
In 2005, the Supreme Court formally acknowledged the differences
between adult and juvenile cognition with its decision in Roper v.
Simmons, wherein the Court held that that imposing the death
penalty on individuals for capital crimes committed under the age of
eighteen is an excessive punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. While the Roper Court discussed how the
particularities of juvenile cognition relate to the culpability of
youthful offenders, the Court's discussion is also relevant to the
vulnerability of juvenile suspects in police interrogations.
74. Id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 730.
76. Id. at 730 n.1.
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the Roper majority, explained that
there are three reasons why juveniles cannot be classified as the most
heinous offenders, for which the death penalty is reserved: First,
juveniles are comparatively less mature and more likely to engage in
reckless behavior than are adults; second, juveniles are more
susceptible to negative external pressures and have less control over
their environment than do adults; and third, juveniles' personalities
are still in transition and are less static than those of adults. As the
Roper Court observed, the social consensus that juveniles are
cognitively different than adults shows in the many laws restricting
juveniles from participating in certain activities engaged in by adults."
Laws and restrictions targeting youth stem from both
paternalistic notions and concerns about juvenile capacity. In
prohibiting those under eighteen from voting or serving on juries,
state legislatures are expressing a concern about juvenile maturity
and cognitive development.8 These laws are also rooted in a desire to
protect juveniles from certain behaviors, as with prohibitions against
underage drinking." The same considerations relevant in the Roper
Court's holding regarding differences between adult and juvenile
cognition also apply in determining how to best preserve juveniles'
*82
right against self-incrimination in an interrogation setting.
As the Roper Court observed, juveniles' personalities are more
dynamic than those of adults, shifting and making dramatic leaps as
the youths mature. 3 While there may be overall trends in juvenile
cognitive development, youth develop at different rates, as they react
to the forces of their external environment and heredity. Thus, a
random selection of sixteen-year-olds would reveal a full spectrum of
maturity levels, social skills, and developmental abilities. The
differences in cognitive levels among youth of the same age would
make it difficult for a court to fairly determine whether or not that
child had "knowingly and intelligently" waived her Miranda rights
without undertaking cumbersome, timely, and costly in-depth
78. Id. at 568-70.
79. Id. at 569.
80. Id.
81. See NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NO. 67, ALCOHOL ALERT (2006), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/
publications/aa67/AA67.pdf.
82. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
83. Id. at 570.
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individualized analysis of each juvenile defendant's cognitive state. A
per se approach to Miranda waivers would alleviate courts of this
burden and ensure that youth are properly protected, especially those
who may appear deceptively mature due to the seriousness of their
crimes or their adult-like appearance.
Also relevant in the context of police interrogation is the
tendency for young people to be more impulsive than adults and
more driven by the short-term consequences of their actions." In an
interrogation setting, when presented with the opportunity to waive
her rights or remain silent, a juvenile's method of processing
information may negatively impact her ability to fully weigh both
options and the long-term consequences thereof." Richard Leo and
Steven Drizin argue that juvenile defendants resemble the
developmentally disabled in "their eagerness to comply with adult
authority figures, impulsivity, immature judgment, and inability to
recognize and weigh risks in decision-making," and that both groups
deserve special protections during the interrogation process due to
these vulnerabilities.'
B. Juvenile Comprehension of the Miranda Warnings
Thomas Grisso has extensively researched and studied the ways
juvenile cognitive development and maturity affect the capacities of
youthful offenders at various stages of the adjudicative process, from
the initial police interrogation to competency to stand trial." In the
late 1970s, Grisso conducted a series of studies to contrast juveniles'
understanding of Miranda warnings with that of adults, examining
both groups' ability to comprehend the words of the warnings and the
significance and purpose of those words." He compared the results
84. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent
Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53,62 (2007).
85. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY,
137, 171 (1997).
86. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891,1005 (2004).
87. see THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Adolescents' Decision Making: A
Developmental Perspective on Constitutional Provisions in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006).
88. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1143 (1980).
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obtained from three groups of juveniles, each in some form of
detention, and two samples of adults, both offenders and non-
offenders, to look for differences between juvenile and adult
comprehension of the Miranda warnings.89 Grisso's studies used three
different measures in evaluating the participant's level of
understanding, two of which asked for verbal responses and one that
required "true" or "false" answers."
In the "Rights" component of Grisso's test, examiners asked
juveniles to paraphrase each sentence of the Miranda warning in their
own words.91 In the "Vocab" measure of the study, examiners asked
juveniles to define six key words in the Miranda warnings: "consult,
attorney, interrogation, appoint, entitled, and right."" With the third
measure, examiners showed juveniles twelve reworded versions of the
Miranda warnings, which other youth had provided in a pilot study,
and asked them to answer in "true or false" format whether the
reworded phrase had the same meaning as the original Miranda
statement." Grisso found that juveniles displayed a significantly
lower comprehension rate of the Miranda warnings in contrast with
the study's adult participants.94
Grisso found that over half of the juveniles tested demonstrated
an "inadequate" understanding of at least one of the four Miranda
warnings in contrast with 23.1% of the adults. Of the four Miranda
warnings, the phrase most commonly misunderstood by juveniles was
their right to have an attorney present before and during
interrogation, with 44.8% of the juveniles and 14.6% of the adults
giving "inadequate" responses on this issue.' In addition, 63.3% of
the juveniles misunderstood at least one of the six crucial words in the
89. Id. at 1149-50.
90. Id. at 1144.
91. Id. at 1146. The study used the Miranda warning form used by the St. Louis
County Police Department's Juvenile Division: "You do not have to make a statement
and have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law. You have the right to consult an attorney before interrogation and to have
an attorney present at the time of the interrogation. If you cannot afford an attorney, one
will be appointed for you." Id. at 1144.
92. Id. at 1146.
93. Id. at 1147.
94. Id. at 1152.
95. Id. at 1153-54.
96. Id. at 1154.
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Miranda warnings compared with 37.3% of the adults." The study
found that 27.6% of the juveniles obtained the highest score on the
true or false "Rights" component of the test compared with 62.7% of
the adult subjects." Grisso's study also measured juveniles'
comprehension of the legal significance and protective function of the
Miranda warnings."
In conjunction with a panel of lawyers and psychologists, Grisso
argued that in order to "knowingly and intelligently" waive one's
Miranda rights, a suspect must (1) understand the nature of
interrogation and the police's role as an information-seeking
adversary; (2) understand that she has a right to counsel who will
work as an advocate bound by confidentiality rules; and (3)
understand that the "right to remain silent" means there is an
absolute right against self-incrimination extending throughout the
adjudicative process." To compare juvenile and adult compre-
hension and knowledge of these areas, the interviewers asked study
participants a series of questions relating to a cartoon of an
interrogation scene, in which no emotions were visible on the
characters in the scenario."o
Grisso found that the juveniles in the study displayed several key
differences in their understanding of the purpose and legal
significance behind the Miranda warnings." First, 61.8% of the
juveniles in the study believed that a judge could penalize them for
invoking their right to remain silent, in contrast with 21.7% of the
adults tested. 3 Additionally, 55.3% of the youth tested thought that
they would have to explain their criminal activity in court if asked by
a judge, as did 42.9% of the ex-offenders surveyed.'? Grisso
concluded that juveniles under fifteen years of age and juveniles ages
fifteen and sixteen with IQ scores below eighty had significantly
worse comprehension of both the Miranda warnings and their
function compared with adults.o' The sixteen-year-old juvenile
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1148.
100. Id. at 1147.
101. Id. at 1148-50.
102. Id. at 1158.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1158-59.
105. Id. at 1160.
[Vol. 38:41068 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
AMIRANDA AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS
participants in the study had the same level of comprehension
regarding their rights as those individuals ages seventeen to twenty-
one.
In a later article, Grisso explained that while there are not
significant differences between an adult's understanding of the words
in Miranda warnings and that of most juveniles once they reach
fifteen or sixteen, youth of that age are less clear than their adult
counterparts on the significance of the warnings and the nature of
their rights." For example, Grisso explained that juveniles have only
a superficial understanding of their attorney's role as advocate and
that they believe that the attorney serves as less of an advocate for
youth who had actually committed offenses." Other research has
shown that juveniles tend to think of legal rights as conditional, which
"adults can grant, and then take away, especially if they do not say
what they believe adults want them to say." "
A more recent study using modified versions of Grisso's
measurement instruments from the 1970s found similar trends in
juveniles' comprehension of the Miranda warnings.o Researchers
wanted to replicate Grisso's studies to assess the effectiveness of the
simplified Miranda warnings now used in most jurisdictions and to
evaluate whether today's juvenile population, which has greater
exposure to the police through media, is savvier than the youth
participants from Grisso's study.' The results of the more recent
study showed that the juvenile participants, particularly younger
juveniles and those with lower IQs, had comprehension problems
similar to those from Grisso's study, even with the more simplified
warnings of today."' Grisso's original studies and the more recent
version modeled after his indicate that juveniles might be more
vulnerable in an interrogation setting than their adult counterparts
106. Id.
107. Grisso, supra note 88, at 10-11.
108. Id.
109. Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of
Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 125,164-65 (2007).
110. Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders' Miranda Rights
Comprehension and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10
ASSESsMENT 359, 360, 368 (2003), available at http://www.wisspd.org/html/training/
ProgMaterials/Conf2007/WEfr/JOMR.pdf.
111. Id. at 366.
112. Id.
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and more at risk of waiving their rights without a full understanding
of the nature of those rights. In addition to comprehension problems,
juveniles' tendency to be more suggestible than adults renders them
more vulnerable to police interrogation techniques.
C. Juveniles' Unique Susceptibility to Police Interrogation Techniques
The Miranda Court expressed concern about "the interrogation
atmosphere and the evils it can bring.""' Delivering the Miranda
Court's opinion, Chief Justice Warren cited certain police practices
intended to elicit confessions from suspects, such as isolating the
individual to be interrogated and keeping him away from familiar
faces, insisting on the suspect's guilt, questioning with dogged
perseverance for lengthy bouts of time, and, in the event that a
suspect refuses to talk or asks for a relative, to acknowledge the
suspect's right to remain silent while "point[ing] out the incriminating
significance of the suspect's refusal to talk."114 The Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, a principle stemming back to
English common law, lies at the heart of the adversarial system, in
which the government bears the burden of independently proving the
charges against a suspect."' The procedural safeguards set forth in
Miranda serve to counter the inherently coercive nature of police
interrogation. However, police departments have adapted to
Miranda and have developed interrogation techniques intended to
elicit waivers from suspects and obtain admissible incriminating
statements in spite of the Miranda warnings."' A juvenile who does
not understand her rights in the first place may be particularly
vulnerable to such manipulation during an interrogation.
Barry C. Feld studied the interrogation records for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old juveniles who had been charged with felony-level
offenses in the Twin Cities area of Minnesota."' Feld noted in his
study that of the sixty-six juvenile records he reviewed, in 56% of the
interrogations, the police had not given the Miranda warnings
113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966).
114. Id. at 450-51, 453-54.
115. Id. at 458-60.
116. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REv. 397, 412-13
(1999).
117. Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MiNN. L. REv. 26, 61-62 (2006).
1070 [Vol. 38:4
immediately, instead using casual conversation and "booking
questions" to establish rapport with the young suspects and
"subtly ... predispose the suspect to waive her rights and talk with
the police."" Although the police must advise a suspect of her
Miranda rights prior to interrogation, routine "booking questions"
are exempt from the Miranda requirement."9
Feld also found that police officers delivered the Miranda
warnings in ways intended to elicit waivers from juvenile suspects,
such as suggesting that the youth "tell the truth" prior to giving the
Miranda warning and presenting the warnings as a mere formality,
emphasizing "the routine nature of the .. . warnings by referring to a
suspect's familiarity with it from seeing it on television and in movies"
or using the form itself as "an opportunity to convert the waiver
process into an exercise in bureaucratic paper-pushing." 20 Feld noted
that 15% of the juveniles he studied invoked their Miranda rights
immediately and that 5% invoked them when the police began asking
more challenging questions, with 80% of the youth waiving their
rights.12' This waiver rate is comparable to what Richard Leo
observed in his 1996 study of police interrogation of adult
defendants.22
Feld interpreted that the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds he
studied exhibited an adult-like understanding of the substance of the
Miranda warnings, noting that most of the juveniles read along with
and initialed each warning and that the majority of the youth read
aloud the final paragraph of the warning and signed the statement
that they understood their rights.'" While Feld acknowledged that
such gestures might indicate compliance rather than understanding,
he stated that because judges do not have the time to conduct
individualized assessments of each offender's cognition, the signing,
initialing, and reading aloud could serve as "the types of objective
evidence upon which trial judges and appellate courts necessarily
rely" to determine whether the youth knowingly and intelligently
118. Id. at 73-74.
119. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990).
120. Feld, supra note 117, at 74-76.
121. Id. at 84, 90.
122. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 276 (1996).
123. Feld, supra note 117117, at 90-91.
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waived his or her rights. 24 Based on his research, Feld suggested that
the current protections surrounding juvenile interrogation are
adequate for juveniles sixteen years and older.'" Feld also noted that
in only looking at the interrogation records for juveniles charged with
felony-level offenses, 42% of whom had one or more prior felony
arrests at the time they were interrogated, his study might not address
how "police obtain waivers from and interrogate ... less sophisticated
juveniles who may be more vulnerable."'26
Although Feld distinguished juveniles over fifteen as exhibiting a
similar level of comprehension of their Miranda rights as adults, there
is research suggesting that juvenile offenders have other cognitive
issues that might affect their perception of the police and custodial
interrogation. For instance, researchers studying the prevalence of
mental health issues in juvenile offenders found that 20% of youth
entering the juvenile justice system have "serious mental health
disorders," with 70% to 90% "meet[ing] official criteria for at least
one psychiatric diagnosis."127 A 2006 study conducted by the National
Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice found that of those
youth involved in the juvenile justice system with mental health
problems, nearly, 61% were also struggling with substance abuse
issues.128 More striking, particularly for those who might suspect the
over-diagnosis of troubled youth with psychiatric conditions, is the
assessment by Howard Snyder of the National Center for Juvenile
Justice that "58% of committed youth ages 15 to 17 had not
completed eighth grade compared with 24% in the U.S.
population."129 While adult criminal defendants also exhibit higher-
than-average rates of learning disorders, mental health problems, and
substance abuse issues than the nonoffender population, juveniles
facing those obstacles have the added age and power differential with
124. Id.
125. Id. at 100-01.
126. Id. at 64.
127. David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study:
Emerging Issues Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM.
J.L. & MED. 503, 509 (2006).
128. Youth with Mental Health Disorders in the Juvenile Justice System: Results from a
Multi-State Prevalence Study, RESEARCH & PROGRAM BRIEF (Nat'1 Ctr. for Mental Health &
Juvenile Justice, Delmar, N.Y.), June 2006, available at http://ncmhjj.com/pdfs/publications/
PrevalenceRPB.pdf.
129. Katner, supra note 127, at 509-10.
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adults that leave them particularly vulnerable during an
*130interrogation.
D. Juveniles' Relations with Authority Figures
While the Court has clearly held that the police must read a
defendant his or her Miranda rights when a person "in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent,"
the Court's guidelines on what specific conditions constitute custodial
interrogation are less clear. 3' The Miranda Court stated that a
defendant is in custody when the police deprive an individual's
"freedom of action in any significant way.""' The police interrogate a
suspect if they act or speak in a way they should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.'33 Juveniles are not on equal
legal footing with adults and do not have the same room to move
around freely in the world as they might wish. Juveniles operate in
many ways as a subjugated group of individuals, expected to submit
to the authority of adults around them everywhere. This relates to
their perception of being free to leave when subjected to questioning
by the police and to their susceptibility to persuasive interrogation
techniques.
From teachers to parents to coaches, juveniles constantly receive
orders directing them where to be and how to behave, and
''socialization presents considerable pressure for children to acquiesce
to adult's wishes."'3 The fact that juveniles are already restricted in
their freedom to move about in their daily lives creates a complex
relationship with adult authority figures, particularly if these adults
are the police. The level of personal freedom that courts ascribe to
juvenile defendants seems particularly curious when applied to the
cases of young defendants questioned at school. Few adults would
feel comfortable refusing to answer the police's questions, let alone a
fifteen-year-old taken out of her school classroom by school security
personnel or the police.
130. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword, Incarceration American Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 237, 245 (2009).
131. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); see also Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
132. Id.
133. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
134. Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992).
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IV. Where the States Stand Following Fare and Alvarado
A. State Approaches to Juvenile Custodial Interrogation
In line with the Alvarado Court, most states evaluate a series of
objective factors when applying the Miranda custody test for juvenile
defendants and do not take the suspect's age into account. As Justice
O'Connor acknowledged in her Alvarado concurrence, age may be a
factor in the custody determination for certain defendants, yet some
lower courts are granting more weight to objective factors, such as
whether or not the police told the suspect she was free to leave the
"interview" site."' The interrogation analysis theoretically leaves
more room for courts to consider a suspect's young age. The
following cases highlight the two contrasting approaches to the
custody analysis as applied to juvenile defendants, and the interplay
between the custody test and the interrogation inquiry.
1. States That Consider a Suspect's Age in the Custody Analysis
In line with the concerns expressed in Haley, Gallegos, and Gault
that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults during interrogation,
certain state courts look at the defendant's age when applying the
Miranda custody test despite the Alvarado Court's holding that this
consideration is not necessary. The Ohio Ninth District Court of
Appeals examined the Alvarado decision in In re A.A., in which the
police questioned a high school student at school in a closed office
regarding his involvement in a breaking and entering.'36 In discussing
the Alvarado decision, the A.A. court noted that the Supreme Court
had not rejected age as a factor to consider in the Miranda custody
analysis, but held that it was reasonable for a state court not to take
this into account." Thus, the A.A. court held that because "a person
in [the defendant's] situation would have known that, if he left before
the assistant principals were finished with him, he could face adverse
consequences, such as detention," he had been in custody during the
interview at school."' The fact that the three authority figures
questioning the boy did not tell him he was free to leave was a factor
135. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 669 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v.
Simmons, 65 WASH & LEE L. REv. 385, 437-43 (2008).
136. In re A.A., No. 08CA009512, 2009 WL 2488010, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17,2009).
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id.
1074 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:4
in the court's analysis, yet the court also considered the unique
restrictions on liberty facing a school-age child.139
Certain state courts have discussed the young age of a defendant
when applying the Miranda custody test, yet have grappled with how
an individual's youth impacts her perception of being free to leave,
ultimately finding that the suspect's age did not tip the scale towards
custodial interrogation." In the custody analysis, these courts
primarily rely on the police's behavior, such as whether the officer
explicitly told the suspect she was free to leave and whether the
suspect was actually placed under arrest.14' For example, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska held in In re Interest of Tyler F. that a fourteen-
year-old male was not in custody when security guards at the boy's
school escorted him from class to a windowless room, where the
police questioned him for twenty minutes without advising him of his
Miranda rights.142 The Tyler F. court acknowledged that "there is no
easy answer to the issue of whether a suspect's age should factor into
the custody assessment," yet the court declined to provide a solution
to the conundrum, after assessing case law from other jurisdictions
and the fact that the defense counsel had not addressed this issue for
the court.143
2. States that Do Not Consider a Suspect's Age in the Custody Analysis
In contrast, various state courts have explicitly rejected taking a
suspect's age into account when determining whether the youth was
subjected to custodial interrogation, often involving questioning that
took place at the juvenile's school. For example, in 2009, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in In re J.D.B. looked at whether or not a
thirteen-year-old boy had been under custodial interrogation when he
gave incriminating statements to the police without being advised of
his Miranda rights.'"
139. Id.
140. See CSC v. State, 118 P.3d 970, 973, 977 (Wyo. 2005) (holding that a sixteen-year-
old male had not been in custody when questioned at school without being advised of his
Miranda rights by two Sheriff's investigators, a police officer, and two school employees in
a conference room yet addressing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Alvarado, stating
that in certain instances age should be taken into account).
141. See In re Tyler F., 755 N.W.2d 360, 367 (Neb. 2008).
142. Id. at 371.
143. Id.
144. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009).
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The police suspected the J.D.B. defendant, a seventh grade
special education student, of breaking into several homes after
receiving a report that he was in possession of a stolen camera and
speaking with him near one of the residences on the same day as the
robbery.'45 Two police investigators went to the boy's school and
pulled him into a conference room, where they questioned the youth
in front of a school resource officer, the assistant principal, and an
intern." The door of the conference room where the questioning
took place was closed but not locked.'47 The investigators did not
advise the boy's parents before questioning him, nor did they read the
youth his Miranda rights.'" The boy asked whether he would still be
in trouble if he gave the stolen items back, and the investigator
"responded that it would be helpful, but that the matter was still
going to court and that [the police] may have to seek a secure custody
order." 49 When the investigator asked the child if he understood that
he was free to leave and did not have to speak with the police, the
youth nodded "yes" in response and proceeded to incriminate
himself, including in a written statement.' The entire "interview"
lasted for thirty to forty-five minutes, and the boy was allowed to
leave when the bell rang indicating the end of the school day."'
The J.D.B. court emphasized that the custody analysis involves
an objective standard and that while "subjective mental
characteristics" are to be considered in evaluating whether a waiver
of rights is "knowing and intelligent," these factors are not relevant in
looking to see whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty
to leave or that he was "under the equivalent of formal arrest."15
Further, the J.D.B. court stated that a police interview in the
inherently restrictive school environment would only become
custodial if "law enforcement ... subject[ed] the student to 'restraint
on freedom of movement' that goes well beyond the limitations that
are characteristic of the school environment in general." 53
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 137.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 140.
153. Id. at 138.
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Emphasizing the importance of having a clear guideline for the police
to follow, the J.D.B. court "decline[d] to extend the test for custody
to include consideration of the age and academic standing of an
individual subjected to questioning by police." The J.D.B. court
noted that Alvarado was persuasive but not binding, as that decision
involved only an analysis of whether the state court's decision had
been reasonable under the AEDPA.54 Because the young defendant
in J.D.B. had not been in custody, he was not entitled to the
protections of Miranda.'
3. State Approaches to the Interrogation Analysis
Under Rhode Island v. Innis, interrogation occurs when law
enforcement uses words or actions they should have known would
elicit an incriminating response from a suspect."' The inquiry
emphasizes the perception of the suspect over the intentions of the
police."' In practice, certain state courts have considered a suspect's
age when evaluating whether or not interrogation occurred. For
example, the Massachusetts Appeals Court determined in
Commonwealth v. Clark C. that a police lieutenant had interrogated a
juvenile suspect for Miranda purposes, taking the suspect's young age
into account."' The lieutenant in Clark C. spoke with the boy's
grandmother regarding his involvement in a home invasion, and the
youth called the police station five days later.' During the phone
call, the juvenile told the lieutenant he would make arrangements to
be picked up or go on his own to the assessment center the following
day.'60 When the boy did not show up the next day, the lieutenant
arrived at his home with an arrest warrant and, after being let in to
the home, proceeded to the suspect's room where he was still
sleeping. 6 ' The lieutenant woke the boy up and told him he had an
arrest warrant, to which the boy responded, "[D]id my grandmother
turn me in?"162 The lieutenant answered in the negative, but then
154. Id. at 140 n.1.
155. Id. at 140.
156. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
157. Id.
158. Commonwealth v. Clark C., 797 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id.
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proceeded to tell the boy that he had said he would turn himself in
when they spoke on the phone.163
Clark C. agreed with the lower court's finding that the
lieutenant's reference to the phone call was the functional equivalent
of interrogation, after taking into account all the circumstances,
"including the fact that Clark C. was a juvenile."6' Thus, the Clark C.
court excluded the boy's response, which the lieutenant elicited
before administering the Miranda warnings. 6' However, a review of
state case law has shown that following Alvarado, juvenile defendants
remain vulnerable during police interrogation as courts frequently
overlook their young age in the initial custody determination, thus
depriving the youth of their Miranda rights regardless of whether
express questioning or its functional equivalent occurred.
As an example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found
in In re J.H. that the responses a twelve-year-old boy gave to a police
officer regarding the youth's alleged sexual abuse of his sister were
admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings." The officer in J.H.
went to the boy's school in plain clothes with a gun holstered to his
hip, which he testified the boy could not see because of the officer's
overcoat."' The officer questioned the juvenile in a large room at the
boy's school, and asked him about the incident with his sister,
following a ten- or fifteen-minute discussion about sports and the
pictures in the room. 66 The officer never told the boy whether he was
free to leave the room, instead explaining that the suspect never
asked about leaving.'69 The court noted in its analysis that the officer
never made any threats or promises, but that he did ask the boy if he
knew the difference between lying and telling the truth, and then told
the child more than once that he should be honest with the officer."o
The boy ultimately confessed to abusing his sister in writing without
having been advised of his Miranda rights.17'
163. Id. at 8-9.
164. Id. at 9.
165. Id.
166. In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643, 645-46 (D.C. 2007).
167. Id. at 646.
168. Id. at 647.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Despite the fact that the officer was clearly asking questions to
elicit an incriminating response, the J.H. court held that the boy's
confession was admissible after determining that he had not been in
custody.172 While noting that it did not have to consider the boy's
young age due to Alvarado, the J.H. court discussed the defendant's
young age anyway and affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
interview was about "as non-custodial as one could imagine of an
interview of a juvenile in school by a law enforcement officer."173 In
finding that the boy had not been in custody, the J.H. court noted that
the officer did not restrain the child in any way, "nor was he
overbearing or dominating." 17 4 In the same way that state courts are
grappling with how to factor a suspect's young age into the custodial
analysis, courts have adopted a number of approaches to evaluating
whether or not a juvenile has waived her Miranda rights "knowingly
and intelligently."
B. State Approaches to Juvenile Miranda Waivers
1. The Per Se Presence of Counsel Rule
New Jersey's approach to juvenile Miranda waivers addresses the
concerns of the Haley, Gallegos, and Gault Courts. In 2009, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held in State ex rel. P.M.P. that a juvenile may
not waive his right to counsel without an attorney present.7  In
P.M.P. the Prosecutor's Office filed a complaint against a twenty-
year-old male for a sexual assault he allegedly committed at the age
of thirteen or fourteen and arrested the suspect at his home pursuant
to a warrant."'7  During its investigation of the reported crime, a
detective at the prosecutor's office had phoned the defendant, posing
as the assault victim.' 77 The arresting detectives reported that upon
their arrival at his home, the defendant stated that he knew why the
detectives were there and that "[s]he, [the alleged victim], called
[him] last night."77 The detectives brought the suspect to the
prosecutor's office and advised him of his Miranda rights; after
172. Id. at 651.
173. Id. at 650.
174. Id. at 651.
175. State ex rel. P.M.P., 975 A.2d 441, 442-43 (N.J. 2009).
176. Id. at 442-44.
177. Id. at 443.
178. Id. at 444.
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waiving his rights, the defendant admitted to engaging in sexual
activity with the victim. 179 Looking in large part to state statutory law,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held in P.M.P. that the trial court was
correct in suppressing the defendant's statements to the detectives."
The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously held in State v.
Sanchez that, following indictment, adult defendants may not waive
their Miranda rights absent defense counsel."st Further, following
Gault, the New Jersey legislature codified protections for juvenile
defendants in the state's Code of Juvenile Justice, under which a
juvenile defendant has the right "to be represented by counsel at
every critical stage in the proceeding" and may only waive her
Miranda rights at these critical stages after consultation with
counsel.18 In P.M.P., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor is acting in an accusatory not an investigatory role when it
files a juvenile delinquency complaint, qualifying it as a "critical
stage" in the proceedings.'83 Thus, the juvenile defendant's waiver of
his Miranda rights in P.M.P. was invalid as it had been obtained prior
to any consultation with defense counsel." In contrast, California has
adopted a pure totality of the circumstances approach in evaluating
whether a juvenile Miranda waiver is "knowing and intelligent."
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Rule
In People v. Burton, the California Supreme Court extended the
scope of Miranda protections for juveniles, holding that when "a
minor is taken into custody and is subjected to interrogation, without
the presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents,
made at any time prior to or during questioning, must, in the absence
of evidence demanding a contrary conclusion, be construed to
indicate that the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege.""' In People v. Lessie, the California Supreme
Court reviewed the validity of this holding, based on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Fare v. Michael C. to uphold the "totality
179. Id.
180. Id. at 448.
181. Id. at 446; State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 409 (N.J. 1992).
182. P.M.P., 975 A.2d at 447.
183. Id. at 448.
184. Id.
185. People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 798-99 (Cal. 1971).
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of the circumstances" test for assessing whether a juvenile Miranda
waiver is "knowing and intelligent."'8
The police arrested the sixteen-year-old Lessie defendant on
suspicion of murder during a street fight based on "information
identifying [the] defendant as the shooter."'8 At the police station,
the officers asked the defendant if he wanted anyone else to know
that he had been arrested, to which he responded that he wanted to
call his father.'" The juvenile did not have his father's phone number,
and the police said they would have him fill out paperwork "in the
meantime."'89  After several routine booking questions, the police
advised the boy of his Miranda rights and began questioning the
youth, at one point telling him that members of his own family had
identified him as the shooter." The juvenile, who was tried as an
adult, claimed that he had been forced into committing the murder as
a gang initiation and would have been beaten or killed had he not
complied; he was convicted of second degree murder. 91
The Lessie court held that the boy's request for his probation
officer was not an invocation of his Miranda rights and overturned
the Burton rule in light of the holding in Fare.'" A key factor in the
Lessie court's analysis was the Truth-in-Evidence provision of the
California Constitution, passed by voters in 1982 as part of the
Victim's Bill of Rights, under which relevant evidence can only be
excluded under compulsion of the Federal Constitution rather than
state constitutional rules. 93 Because the Burton rule provided an
added level of protection for defendants beyond the totality of the
circumstances test required in Fare, the Lessie court overruled
Burton. 94  The Lessie defendant argued that his request for a
probation officer should still qualify as invoking his Miranda rights, as
Burton had involved the defendant's request to speak with his
parents.'95 However, the Lessie court rejected this argument, stating
186. People v. Lessie, 223 P.3d 3, 4-5 (Cal. 2010).
187. Id. at 5.
188. Id. at 6.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 5, 7-8.
192. Id. at 14.
193. Id. at 9-10; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2).
194. Lessie, 223 P.3d at 13.
195. Id. at 10-11.
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that the Fare Court emphasized that "only a request for an attorney
constitutes a per se invocation of a suspect's Fifth Amendment
privilege."
With juvenile defendants in particular, using a totality of the
circumstances approach to assess the voluntariness of a Miranda
waiver is a complex and ambitious undertaking for the court to
assume. Given the variations in juvenile cognition from one youth to
the next, looking back at an interrogation to assess whether a waiver
was truly "knowing and intelligent" is a seemingly impossible task.
Further, there is a tendency to mistake the severity of a crime
conducted by a youth with cognitive sophistication.
3. The Parental Presence/Interested Guardian Rule
Despite the Court's holding in Fare, numerous state courts and
legislatures apply a rule similar to that in Burton and require that a
parent or an "interested adult" be present before the police advise
juvenile defendants of their Miranda rights, often only as a per se
requirement for juveniles under fourteen.'" While certain parents
may provide their children with emotional support during the
interrogation, some end up actually encouraging a waiver by advising
their children to "tell the truth" and to "talk" to the authorities out of
confusion, morality, or even a misunderstanding of the Miranda rights
themselves." Parents may also have conflicts of interest, such as a
relationship with another suspect or one of the victims in the
investigation, or a personal desire to find out if the juvenile actually
committed the crime in question.
196. Id. at 11.
197. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10 (stating that "for a juvenile to voluntarily and
intelligently waive his right must be given opportunity to consult with an adult, the adult
must be one who is not only genuinely interested in welfare of the juvenile but completely
independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or
attorney representing the juvenile and the independent interested adult must be informed
and be aware of the rights"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (1996). See also
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983).
198. See Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children, Are
Protections Adequate?, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 151, 154 (1999).
199. See Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial
Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1295 (2004).
[Vol. 38:41082
MIRANDA AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS
4. Additional Procedural Safeguards
Some states require that all custodial interrogation of juveniles
be electronically recorded so that courts can better assess whether or
not that juvenile voluntarily waived her Miranda rights.2m For
example, in 2004 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the
totality of the circumstances test over a per se parental or guardian
presence rule for assessing whether or not a juvenile had waived her
rights." However, the court held that "all custodial interrogation of
juveniles ... be electronically recorded where feasible, and without
exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention."202 The
court noted that in addition to protecting juveniles, the electronic
recording rule would protect police officers accused of coercive
interrogation techniques .2 ' Recognizing the benefit for its own
officers, certain police departments have adopted a policy to routinely
record custodial interrogations.
Conclusion
The Alvarado Court upheld the use of an objective standard in
determining whether a juvenile is in custody largely out of fear that
holding otherwise would overburden the police, by asking them to
consider a defendant's subjective mental state before administering
the Miranda warnings. In contrast, factors that most courts consider
in the Miranda custody test, such as the duration of questioning and
the interrogation site, are easy for the police to control. While it is
true that the police have a sometimes thankless, difficult and
dangerous job, the issue on the other side of the balance is the risk
that juvenile suspects have less protection under the current custodial
interrogation test.
As discussed above, certain courts consider a suspect's age in the
Miranda custody test yet seem reluctant to part ways with Alvarado,
except for extremely young defendants. In line with the underlying
rehabilitative intent behind juvenile adjudication, research on
juvenile cognition, and the inherent power differential between the
police and juvenile defendants, when a suspect under eighteen years
200. See, e.g., Stephen v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Alaska 1985).
201. In re Jerrell CJ., 699 N.W.2d 110, 121 (Wis. 2005).
202. Id. at 113.
203. Id. at 122.
204. See Feld, supra note 117, at 60.
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of age is questioned by the police, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the youth is under custodial interrogation. Given
the challenges facing juvenile offenders in terms of mental health and
substance abuse issues, in conjunction with comparably low levels of
education, giving protections for just those youth ages fifteen and
under leaves older juveniles still vulnerable. The Alvarado Court's
concerns about the various ways that a defendant's prior experience
with law enforcement would affect his or her perception of being free
to leave are legitimate. Yet, asking a defendant's age before
questioning and then proceeding accordingly is a finite and simple
procedure for the police to incorporate in the interrogation process.
Further, as some state courts and legislatures have already
adopted, there should be a per se requirement that the police not
advise suspects under eighteen of their Miranda rights in the absence
of counsel. Drawing the line at eighteen parallels the Court's decision
in Roper v. Simmons, yet this may still leave those with
developmental delays without adequate protection during
interrogation.20 5 In light of Grisso and Feld's research on juveniles'
relatively poor comprehension of both the words and substance of the
warnings and broader findings regarding juvenile cognition, the
attorney can provide a neutral buffer zone between the police and the
suspect, a role that not every parent or interested adult can fill. A per
se approach will both save courts of the burdens and inaccuracies of
the totality of the circumstances approach, which for juveniles would
involve in-depth analysis of each defendant's particular cognitive
abilities, and provide police with a clear rule to follow when
interrogating young suspects. Lastly, as an added protection, state
courts should adopt a rule similar to the one implemented in
Wisconsin requiring that all custodial interrogation of juveniles be
recorded.
205. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
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